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A problem of first impression was resolved by the court in
Finkelstein v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, N. J.1 It was there
held that a policy provision in accordance with the standard fire
policy imposed by Revised Statutes 1950, 22:691 requiring that
suit be brought within twelve months next after "the inception
of the loss" meant only that suit would have to be commenced
within twelve months after the loss became payable by the
company in accordance with other provisions covering the fur-
nishing of proof of loss by the insured. The court favored the
liberal interpretation adopted by most courts in other juris-
dictions, as opposed to the literal, adopted by some.
In another case of first impression, Home Insurance Co. v.
Highway Insurance Underwriters,2 the court held that an insur-
ance company that had paid a collision loss and had taken a
conventional subrogation against the insurance carrier of the
other vehicle involved in the collision, might maintain a direct
action against the latter on the basis of its subrogation. The court
noticed opposing decisions by the Second and First Circuit
Courts of Appeal and preferred to follow the latter. Justice
LeBlanc, dissenting, favored the view of the former that the
direct right of action provided by Act 55 of 1930 was expressly
limited to "the insured person or his or her heirs."
The logic of the case seems to be with the dissenting Justice
although the majority opinion may be more in keeping with the
spirit of the law-if following the spirit can be justified notwith-
standing that violence is done to the letter. The reasons given
by the majority view, as expressed more fully by the court
of appeal, are not convincing. Its position was that the case
did not involve an assignment (the Second Circuit had spoken
in terms of assignment) but conventional subrogation which was
provided for by the Civil Code. And true it is that the plaintiff
was relying on a conventional subrogation. However, the opin-
ion contains language unmistakably indicating that the propo-
sition advanced was founded on the theory of legal subrogation.
Conventional assignment is recognized by the code no less than
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 516, 62 So. 2d 820 (1952).
2. 222 La. 540, 62 So. 2d 828 (1952).
[VOL. XIV
WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
conventional subrogation. And the difference between conven-
tional subrogation and assignment is largely nebulous. Although
conventional subrogation accompanies payment and is limited
to the amount paid it is nevertheless a form of transfer of a
credit or right by way of convention or agreement just as is
an assignment. In short, if an assignment of a right of action
could not vest in the assignee a right of direct action against
a tortfeasor, although possessed by the assignor, it is difficult
to understand why a conventional subrogation could neverthe-
less have such effect. Conventional subrogation takes place
not by operation of law but by agreement, and carefully cir-
cumscribed agreement at that. And so does assignment. What
the court seems to have had in mind was, therefore, legal sub-
rogation, a substitution of the subrogee to the legal position
of the subrogor by operation of law.
Considerable doubt still obtains concerning an insurer's
right to legal subrogation, hence the use of conventional subro-
gation in the instant case. The reasoning of the court gives added
weight to the possibility that insurers are entitled to legal sub-
rogation. May not a collision insurer be bound with another
for the payment of the loss?3 The important thing is that the
insurer "has an interest in discharging" the obligation. This
means that he is not a mere volunteer. A debt of another may
be paid by a third person "no way concerned in it," irrespective
of the wishes of the creditor, provided that "if he act in his own
name, he be not subrogated to the rights of the creditor. '4 Or
the creditor, if he wishes, may subrogate the third person mak-
ing the payment to his rights, actions, privileges and mortgages.
But this is not necessary when the third person, being bound
with others or for others for the payment of the debt, has an
interest in discharging it, that is, is concerned in it. Legal subro-
gation then takes place. Surely a collision insurer who is com-
pelled to pay because another has negligently damaged the
insured property is in this category. This, the opinion seems
to recognize, even to the point of giving the insurer a right
of direct action against the wrongdoer. Granting, however, that
by legal subrogation the direct right of action given by the
statute to the subrogor might vest in the subrogee, it does not
follow that conventional subrogation would produce the same
3. See Art. 2161, La. Civil Code of 1870.
4. See Art. 2134, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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result. At any rate, if the court indulged in judicial legislation,
the chances are the policy of the Legislature was not offended.
An interesting question was presented in Dupuis v. Pruden-
tial Ins. Co. of America.5 The insured failed to make the twen-
tieth and last payment under a 20-payment life policy. The
surrender value of the policy, plus a small dividend due, less
a loan indebtedness, left a balance of $350.63. This sum the
company applied to the purchase of extended term insurance
in an amount less than the full amount of the policy. The
insured died shortly after the extended term insurance expired.
The principal contention of the widow-beneficiary in her suit
against the insurer was that, instead of using the surrender
value to purchase extended term insurance, it should have been
applied in an amount sufficient to pay the final premium due
under the policy, thus converting it into a paid-up policy, the
insured not having made any election himself. The court re-
jected this inviting proposition on the ground that the policy
and statute expressly provided what should be done with the
surrender value of the policy. It found that the doctrine re-
quiring the insurer to use any credits due on a participating
policy so as to keep it in force as originally issued as long as
possible was not applicable for the foregoing reason. Nor would
it yield to the invitation to find an equitable duty on the com-
pany to apply a sufficient amount from the reserve to pay the
final premium. The law seems to require the insurer, in apply-
ing the surrender value to the purchase of extended term insur-
ance, to maintain the policy in force at its full amount. But
even if this be true it would have made no difference in the
result.
It has become customary for life, and health and accident in-
surers to grant coverage from the date of the application sub-
ject to the acceptance of the risk and the issuance of the policy.
In Moll v. Mutual Health Ben. & Acc. Ass'n a provision in the
application stated, "Premium paid on this application covers insur-
ance to Dec. 1, 1947." Three days before the policy was issued the
insured was injured in an automobile accident from which he
died five days later. Judgment for the plaintiff was properly
affirmed. Also sound was the court's rejection of parol evidence
to show that part of the initial premium, which was greater than
5. 222 La. 446, 62 So. 2d 637 (1952).
6. 66 So. 2d 320 (La. 1953).
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the regular annual premium, covered a policy iee. Tnere was no
ambiguity to be explained and the proffered evidence went
beyond the written act.
Section 22:636 of the Revised Statutes subjects the effec-
tiveness of a cancellation of an insurance policy by the insurer
to the actual payment or mailing to the insured of any unearned
premium. In Romero v. Maryland Casualty Co.7 the court
adopted the reasonable view that where, in accordance with
the established practice between a local agent and the insured,
the unearned premium is credited to his account with the agent,
and he is so informed and acquiesces therein, the requirement
of the section is satisfied.
In the preparation of the Insurance Code of 1948 the dis-
junctive "or," present in prior acts, was omitted in the defini-
tion of the different kinds of industrial insurance. This led the
court of appeal to conclude in Mataya v. Delta Life Insurance
Co." that to be recognized as industrial insurance a policy would
have to contain all of the kinds of benefits listed. This view was
rejected by the Supreme Court that noted, in passing, a cor-
rective statute adopted in 1952 for the purpose of replacing
the word "or" after each of the four categories of industrial in-
surance.
In Morelock v. Aetna Life Ins. CoY a provision of the Insur-
ance Code requiring an insurer to distribute the proceeds of a
life or accidental death policy as if the insured survived the
beneficiary where it appears that insured and beneficiary died
simultaneously and there is not sufficient proof to the contrary,
was held to support the action of an insurer in making pay-
ment in accord with the policy provisions applicable where the
beneficiary predeceased the insured. There was some reliance
by plaintiff upon an agreement between the heirs for equal dis-
tribution of the assets of the succession but the court properly
held this agreement not binding on the insurer. It reminded
that the proceeds of such policies make no part of the estate of
an insured.
In Baldwin v. Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co.10 involving the
interpretation of certain provisions respecting the use of a ve-
7. 66 So. 2d 849 (La. 1953).
8. 222 La. 509, 62 So. 2d 817 (1953).
9. 222 La. 712, 63 So. 2d 612 (1953).
10. 221 La. 781, 60 So. 2d 408 (1952).
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hicle covered by a collision policy, the court held that coverage
extended to a loss that occurred during an authorized use not-
withstanding that theretofore the limitations on regular or fre-
quent use had been violated. There was nothing in the contract
as evidenced by the opinion to support the insurer's contention
of forfeiture of the right to make an authorized use of the ve-
hicle in consequence of the prior violation, and the position of
the court seems to have been completely sound.
A putative wife who had collected the proceeds of an in-
surance policy payable to the deceased's "widow" was held
under a quasi-contractual obligation to pay one-half thereof to
the lawful wife in Succession of Fields."' Other interesting
angles to this litigation are dealt with elsewhere in this REVIEW
under their appropriate headings.
The case of Crifasi v. Houston Fire & Casualty Ins. Co.'2
involved only the question of whether the plaintiff, claimant in
a burglary loss, had kept accurate books and records from which
the loss could be determined. The careful analysis of plaintiff's
evidence by the trial court was adopted by the Supreme Court
and the judgment below was affirmed.
In Fireside Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Martin3 the petitioning
insurer was held bound by a statutory requirement that after
a stated date its policies would be subject to the laws and
regulations relative to industrial insurers. Its claim that its
charter contract was being impaired by the enactment was
rejected. The statute merely dealt with the form of policy peti-
tioner could write in the future and constituted a valid exercise




In Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Nesbitt' interpretation of a
so-called assignment, which was in reality a sublease since
11. 222 La. 310, 62 So. 2d 495 (1952).
12. 222 La. 247, 62 So. 2d 395 (1952).
13. 66 So. 2d 511 (La. 1953).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 222 La. 661, 63 So. 2d 417 (1953).
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